A voluntary army's quality exceeds or deceeds a drafted army's quality depending on whether selection is advantageous or adverse. Using a collection of data sets that covers the majority of the U.S. Army soldiers during World War II, we test for the possibility of adverse selection into the military. Rather, we find advantageous selection: volunteers and drafted men showed no significant difference in fatality outcomes, but volunteers earned distinguished awards at a higher rate than drafted men, particularly after Pearl Harbor.
Introduction
In a market economy, the pursuit of comparative advantage may reduce an occupation's average quality compared to a random assignment of workers across occupations. This selection principle implies that if civilian and military abilities are strongly positively associated in the population, a voluntary military will be left with an adversely selected sample of individuals; only individuals with low civilian ability, who also happen to have low military ability, would join the military. By taking high ability individuals into the military, a draft might increase the military's average quality. Regardless of whether information about an individual's skills is private or public, knowing the type of selection (adverse or advantageous) is crucial to evaluate the merits of a voluntary military for national defense. 1 Systematic analyses of selection into the military are few, and none uses war-fighting performance. The fact is that volunteers and draftees are rarely simultaneously observed, actual combat is infrequent, and military performance is not easily quantifiable. Existing studies infer the type of selection by relying on (artificial) peacetime comparisons, including inferences from standardized ability tests, educational outcomes, local labor market conditions, and performance in simulated scenarios; see, e.g., Asch et al. (2005 ), Fernandez, (1992 , Golding and Adedeji (2007) , Orvis et al. (1992) , and Teachman et al. (1993) . In effect, voluntary militaries remain uncommon in the world (Keller et al., 2009, and Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005) probably because of the lack of convincing empirical evidence on their performance. The type of selection matters in just about any transition into a voluntary exchange. For example, Titmuss (1971) , Arrow (1972) , and Stewart (1992) have pointed out that moving toward a voluntary exchange of human organs and tissues (such as blood) might lower average quality by motivating a supply of unhealthy individuals; see Lacetera et al. (2012) , Goette and Stutzer (2008) and Iajya et al. (2012) . Concerns about the quality of supply are also common in many other non-market based allocations that rely on lotteries, such as immigration visas. 2 Economists have discussed at length the theoretical disadvantages of the draft. Hansen and Weisbrod (1967) is a classical contribution. Tax (1967) contains an interdisciplinary view featuring Milton Friedman's position. Adverse selection is absent from these early papers. Sandler and Hartley (1999) and Warner and Asch (2005) surveyed key aspects of recruitment policies, but they do not discuss adverse selection. Early empirical work focused primarily on the forgone earnings of draftees, the supply functions for military personnel, and the response of enlistments and retentions to economic incentives; see, e.g., Oi (1967) and Altman and Barro (1971) . This paper empirically examines the type of selection into the army during the U.S. involvement in World War II; the largest military mobilization in U.S. history. As part of the war efforts, the U.S. implemented a "democratic approach to selection" based on peacetime and wartime drafts; see, e.g., Flynn (1993, p. 25) . Not only were the drafts fair, but volunteers and draftees served side-by-side, and can be distinguished by their Army service numbers.
3 Our analysis combines eight million historical enlistment records and over one hundred thousand entries from the 63rd Infantry Division's morning reports (a detailed account of the Division's daily activities) with fatality statistics (i.e., killed and missed in action) and several lists of the highest honors awarded by the military including the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and the Purple Heart. Ours is a direct comparison of battlefront performance, as measured by valor and loss, between volunteers and drafted men who enter the U.S. Army under the same circumstances, and were observationally equivalent as recorded by their enlistment records and their unit's morning reports.
Overall, selection into the U.S. Army during World War II was advantageous. We find no significant mortality differential between volunteers and draftees, but significant differences in the rate at which volunteers were awarded highest honors compared to draftees. We also find evidence that the type of selection depended upon the conditions of the war: for those who enter into the army just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, men who volunteered went on to win more high honor awards than those who were drafted at the same time. Our tests of selection condition on a large number of covariates, including characteristics used to sort individuals within the military and within-company comparisons. Our findings do not require a causal interpretation, but comparisons in mean wartime performance identify the causal effect of moving from a drafted to a volunteer military on average quality.
Related Literature. The Gates commission (1970, p. 18) , appointed to study the feasibility of an all-volunteer force in the U.S., recognized the importance of selfselection. As an objection to the AVF, the commission noted that "a voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers." Likewise, "by the early 1980s, doubts were expressed about the quality of recruits for the American AVF, the racial balance of ground forces, shortages of skilled military personnel, and the recruiting problems likely to result from the predicted demographic trough of young people in the 1990s;" see Sandler and Hartley (1995, pp. 172-173) . There are several evaluations of the AVF in the U.S. (Meese, 2002, and Warner and Asch, 1995) , but they are no drawn from credible comparisons. 4 The most careful existing work focuses on the causal effect of military service on a variety of life outcomes such as earnings, education, crime, and life expectancy; see, e.g., Angrist (1990) , Bedard and Deschenes (2006) , Card and Cardoso (2012) , and Galiani et al. (2010) . This literature is not at all informative about the type of selection into the military seeing that their goal is precisely to overcome selection biases. A more relevant literature focuses on testing the type of selection in established markets, such as insurance markets; see, e.g., Chiappori and Salanie (2001) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) . The idea in this literature is to examine the (conditional) correlation between an individual's choices and an individual's performance (i.e., the correlation between insurance coverage and the probability of having an accident). Our empirical strategy adapts their "positive correlation" tests, and as expected, pays especial attention to confounding factors.
Background
It is relatively easy but instructive to derive analytical comparisons between a draft and a voluntary military. In order to motivate our empirical work, this section derives such comparisons under alternative informational structures. Consider first a setting with perfect information about an individual's abilities, such as in the Roy (1951) model; see, e.g., Heckman and Honore (1990) . Let  denote the relative wage per unit of efficient labor in the military. The decision to join the military yields  = 1 if  ≥ , with  determined such that the requirement of  soldiers is met,
The voluntary military's average quality is
while the military's average quality under a draft is
Denote the average quality of the civilian economy under a voluntary military by
. Observed military and civilian average qualities satisfy
where E [| ≥ −]  0 is the conditional expectation of a random variable  properly defined to represent the way voluntary selection takes place, and  ∈ [−1 1] is a correlation coefficient that takes negative values if ( )   (); see Heckman and Honore (1990 , pp. 1125 -1127 . That is, when civilian and military abilities are strongly positively associated, the correlation coefficient  takes negative values.
Expressions (3) and (4) Now consider the case with asymmetric information in which abilities cannot be observed but F( ) is common knowledge, such as in Akerlof (1970); see, e.g., Jovanovic (1982) . Military compensation cannot depend on individual types. An individual will
7 Comparisons of conditional expectations originated in the two-sector applications of the Roy (1951) model to unionism and education by Lee (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979) ; these comparisons are by now a central component of any analysis of occupational choice, migration, labor force participation and so on. To correct for the endogeneity of an individual's choices, existing papers typically estimate a selection equation. We do not require a selection equation because we rely on a random sample of the population from one of the sectors.
Observed military and civilian average qualities satisfy
A drafted military is still described by (2).
Expressions (5) and (6) imply that the average quality of the civilian sector is always higher under a voluntary military than under a draft. That is, E[|  ]  E[] as long as   0. As before, the average quality of the military cannot be unambiguously signed.
Suppose that abilities are "positively associated" in the sense that the distribution of abilities F( ) satisfies Pr(|  ) ≤ Pr(). 8 For instance, under normality assump-
is positive. Thus, if civilian and military abilities are positively (negatively) associated, average quality in the military will be higher (lower) under a draft than under a voluntary military. As in the case of perfect information, positive association means that potentially high-ability soldiers would find the military less attractive than the civilian sector. In this case, a draft would also increase average military quality.
Empirical strategy. We conduct two types of analysis. Our main approach estimates
where   is a binary variable for whether individual  enlisted voluntarily,   is a binary variable (to be discussed) that measures the individual 's performance, X  is a vector of observable characteristics that influence an individual's military ability (i.e., individual characteristics, circumstances during the war, or sorting in the army), and  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In an adversely selected sample of volunteers,   0.
We also examine a system of equations
where (     ) are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and   and   are the residuals of each equation. In an adversely selected sample of volunteers,   and   are negatively correlated (conditional on X  ), which is equivalent to (     )  0. Estimates based on (7) and (8) convey the same qualitative information; see, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006, pp. 942-943) . However, since (8) is more computationally intensive due to the large number of controls, we focus on (7).
Interpretation. The parameter  in (7) measures the difference in average quality between volunteers and draftees, conditional on
. By the law of iterated expectations,
which identifies how average quality in the military changes when moving from a draft to a voluntary military. Since (9) is defined over a support set determined by X  , an advantage of a "democratic" draft (i.e., a draft with limited deferments) is that the event   = 0 would occur for multiple values of X  . The parameter , however, is not enough to identify F( ); identification of F( ) requires, for example, restrictions on the second moments of the distribution of the residual terms or the use of variation in prices across markets; see Heckman and Honore (1990) .
By considering both volunteers and a contemporaneously drafted random sample of the population of interest, we are able to compare an experimental group (volunteers) to a control group (drafted men). 9 A threat in our comparison is the presence of confounding factors. For example, the estimates of  in (7) and the complete sample are likely biased 9 During World War II, voluntary enlistments and the draft coexisted so we assume the absence of randomization bias. Let  *  = 1 denote the event: "in the absence of a draft, individual  would have voluntarily enlisted in the army." We assume that
We test for evidence of randomization bias in the Appendix, using the presence of several drafts in the U.S. Army. because the determinants of self-selection may not be exhausted by the explanatory variables in X  . This would be a problem if we were to study the relationship between X  and military quality, as in the empirical literature on the return to schooling (i.e., Willis and Rosen, 1981) .
10 Concerns regarding the decision to select into some group are not valid because the determinants of selection are of ancillary interest to us. Expressions (7) and (8) observations. This constitutes our baseline sample.
Other military outcomes include becoming a prisoner of war (POW), dying in service, killed in action (KIA), or being lost in action (MIA). As noted in the Appendix, these records have been digitized by different agencies and include serial numbers, which are used to merge with the enlistment data. (In the Appendix, we use these outcomes to check for potential biases in our merging procedure for awards.)
Main Findings
This section estimates (7) and (8) in our baseline sample using high honors awards and fatality information as measures of military performance.
Awards for valor. Table 2 reports linear probability estimates of (7). Panel A pertains to any award, panel B pertains to Silver Stars only, and panel C pertains to the 13 Our analysis of the 63rd Infantry division adds the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart to this list. Silver Stars are awarded for "gallantry in action." The awards were principally given by U.S. Army divisions, though, in many cases, they were awarded by higher levels of the U.S. military. Medals of Honor and Distinguished Service Crosses recognize "extraordinary heroism." We do not consider other potential outcomes such as compensation and advancement in rank. This information is not generally available, and these outcomes might not be as interesting as awards since the military operates as an internal labor market subject to pricing and mobility inefficiences; see Rosen (1992) .
Distinguished Service Cross and the Medal of Honor. This last panel combines these two awards because they are each rare events; overall, fewer than 5 in 100,000 awards are recorded in the sample.
Column (1) leaves X  empty, with  measuring the difference in mean awards between volunteers and drafted men.
14 Volunteers were about 30 percent more likely to receive a Silver Star and 75 percent more likely to win either a Distinguished Service Cross or a Medal of Honor. These results are statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. (Table 2 reports standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity; clustering the standard errors by state-year leave the significance unaffected.)
Column (2) includes dummy variable controls for initial assignment, by branch and rank. These controls represent the military's initial assessment of the soldier. These controls are important because one might worry that volunteers who served in World War II were assigned to different areas of the military, and had more opportunities to demonstrate valor. 15 Even with these controls, volunteers are more likely than draftees to receive a Silver Star or any of the awards in our sample. In fact, the estimated difference between volunteers and drafted men only changes marginally from column (1), and retains its statistical significance for Silver Stars and all awards. This is evidence against the hypothesis that only individuals with low-quality military skills would enter the Army by choice. Quite the opposite, the selection appears advantageous as those who enlisted voluntarily were more likely to receive a distinguished award for military performance, conditional on the military's initial assessment. Column (3) 14 Conversations with Doug Sterner, who publishes lists of award recipients for the Military Times, suggest that it is unlikely that awards were granted in a systematic way to artificially increase the likelihood a volunteer would win an award. The announcements for the awards detail actions that would be hard to counterfeit, and often cite multiple concurring first-hand accounts. These descriptions often omit the serial number of the soldier, suggesting that granting authorities may not have been able to identify volunteers versus drafted men. 15 Initial branch placement could have been in the Infantry, Army Mine Planter Service, Chemical Warfare Service, Finance Department, or Warrant Officers initially located in the U.S., among others. The Army paid considerable attention to occupational sorting at enlistment and employed a detailed aptitude test to help sort individuals into their most productive role. Performance on an entrance exam was accidentally recorded for several months of 1943. Unfortunately, this coincided with a period where severe restrictions were placed on volunteering. These restrictions were put in place to resolve logistical concerns for an expanding draft. For drafted men, AGCT scores (a precursor of the AFQT) correlate positively with honor awards. examines a potential source of advantageous selection. Volunteers may exhibit physical traits well suited for service, as measured by their body mass index, BMI, or by their height. To examine the importance of physical strength, we grouped individuals into ten and eight categories respectively according to their BMI and height. (The cutoffs were chosen to create evenly-sized groups.) As column (3) shows, these physical characteristics do not alter the statistical or economic significance of the point estimate for volunteers.
This implies that differences in strength, conditional on being in the Army and on military sorting, are not the main source of advantageous selection.
Given the timing of the draft, it is possible that volunteers entered into the Army earlier than drafted men, or at an earlier age. Column (4) includes controls for year of entry into the military, and age at entry. Adding year of enlistment controls for the differences in the nature of the draft between peacetime draft and wartime draft. 16 In particular, the drafted class of men grew dramatically from 1940 to 1942 as the U.S. prepared for entry into World War II. A control for age at enlistment serves similar purposes.
The draft focused on a selected age group of individuals whose ages differed from those of volunteers; see Table 1 . Column (4) also controls for additional information explicitly used in the draft process. In particular, we control for marital status, whether the individual had dependents, or whether the individual worked in agriculture. As Table 2 shows, the results for Silver Stars and any awards retain their size and statistical significance. The draft had specific age and occupational guidelines. Column (4) controls for the characteristics that were likely to differ between drafted men and the general population.
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Column (5) is our richest specification. In addition to the previously mentioned individual-level characteristics, column (5) The previous results rely on a linear probability model. We also estimate (7) using a probit model. The probit specification and the bivariate probit for (8) can be found in Table 3 . The estimated marginal effects and patterns of statistical significance under a probit procedure are practically the same as those provided here.
Fatality outcomes. We next examine additional outcomes associated with battle participation. These complementary outcomes characterize in more detail differences between volunteers and draftees. For example, if volunteering in the presence of a draft conferred advantages in terms of initial placement, "gaming" of the system should be present in fatality outcomes. Suppose that volunteers expected to be almost surely drafted, but had the option of selecting into the preferred branch or position. Then, volunteers should experience lower combat rates and possibly lower mortality overall.
We consider four additional outcomes: death in service, killed in action (KIA), missing in action (MIA), and prisoner of war (POW of the estimated coefficients, we also include the mean value of these outcomes. We estimate four specifications. Column (1) without any controls, column (2) controls for initial placement, column (3) controls for age and year at entry as well as for whether the individual was any of the following upon entry into the Army: married, had dependents, or employed in agriculture. Column (4) adds state and state-year controls.
As column (1) shows, volunteers bore a disproportionate burden for each of these outcomes, though the size and statistical significance of that burden varies by specification.
Volunteers were about 13 percent more likely to be killed in action and about 35 percent more likely to die while in service compared to drafted men. They were about 3 times more likely to be MIA and 2 times more likely to be a POW. These point estimates contradict the idea of volunteers "gaming" the draft.
Columns (2) to (4) also show that the association between volunteer status and these outcomes weakens considerably as more controls are added. The tenuous statistical significance of these differences vanishes when we cluster the standard errors by state-year (not reported). This weakening also varies by outcome. In panels A and B, the value of  in column (4) is about one-third of the unconditional value, whereas in panels C and D,  is about one-sixth of the unconditional value. The large decline in  as controls are added contrasts with our results on awards, Table 2 . Overall, Table 4 refutes the notion that volunteers entered the Army to avoid the riskier placements compared to drafted men.
The findings regarding fatality outcomes suggest that the differences in quality between volunteers and drafted men are not solely due to opportunity or circumstance.
Additional Findings
Our main sample shows significant differences in the rate at which volunteers were awarded high honors, despite no significant difference in fatality outcomes. This section presents comparisons based on richer controls, peacetime and wartime sub-samples, and companylevel data to address concerns about confounding factors.
Selective placement and replacement. We first investigate the possibility that differences in opportunity between volunteers and drafted men drive the observed difference in awards.
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One way we have controlled for the selective formation of Army groups is to include controls for initial placement; such controls do not vary the statistical significance or magnitude of the coefficient of interest (Table 2 ). An alternative way to control for the dangers (and opportunities) faced by soldiers it to take advantage of the fact that Army units were often created from recruits and draftees from the same geographic areas at the same time of enlistment. To allow for the possibility that the state-year fixed effects are not sufficiently detailed, we construct month-by-county mortality rates. These additional controls reflect the mortality rates for all of those men who enlisted from a particular county in a particular month. (We group the county-months into seventeen evenly sized categories.)
As Table 5 demonstrates, there is a great deal of variation in these controls. Weighing by the number of enlistees by county-month, the mean mortality rate for the countymonth groups varies from under one half of one tenth of one percent, to twelve percent. , Table 3 ) show no concerns for biases at enlistment. For example, there is no evidence of a major difference in the fraction disqualified for service due to medical reasons. The fraction of 20-year old volunteers disqualified for military service prior to May 31, 1941 was 12.6, whereas the fraction of 21-year old draftees disqualified for service was 12.8. magnitude nor the statistical significance of the point estimate. The controls themselves (not reported) are statistically significant. Serving from a county-month that exhibited greater levels of mortality is linked to an individual's likelihood of winning an award, but accounting for that correlation does not diminish the difference in awards won between volunteers and drafted men.
Another confounding factor is that U.S. Army procedures may have induced the differences in awards due to a selective replacement of soldiers into groups that suffered heavy casualties. Historical documentation suggest that selective replacement is unlikely. As described in Rush (2001) , selective replacement is unlikely for several reasons.
21 First, injured soldiers routinely returned to their same organization; injured enlisted men almost exclusively returned to their same company. Second, U.S. Army policy was to supplement units with new soldiers, instead of rotating fresh units onto the front line to replace those units with the heaviest losses. Finally, even non-combat troops were often mobilized into combat situations. Overall, even if there were selective initial placements (which we find no evidence of), such differences would be scrambled by the chaotic and haphazard realities of the battle field.
Selection over time. We next investigate the possibility that the type of selection changed with the conditions of the war. Figure 1 plots the estimates of (7), run separately for each quarter of entry into the military, including controls for initial placement, age at entry, marital status, having dependents, and whether the pre-Army profession was in agriculture. The first estimate corresponds to the fourth quarter of 1940, with a point estimate of −00058 (standard error: 00015). This estimate is the only statistically significant evidence we have found to support adverse selection; the point estimates for the rest of peacetime are insignificant. In contrast, all point estimates for awards during wartime consistently support 21 Several months worth of morning reports for the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division were analyzed in Rush (2001) . Infantry provides a useful case in point, in that "[s]ixty-four percent of all casualties suffered by American forces during World War II were in infantry regiments, which made up about 10 percent of the mobilized forces," Rush (2001, p. xiii) . Dr. Rush generously supplied us with unpublished research conducted with the very same data used in his book. Some of that research is reflected in the discussion below. the idea of advantageous selection. Did volunteers experience different fatality outcomes over time? Figure 2 plots the quarterly regression coefficients for died in service. The lack of a systematic trend reinforces the notion that the differences in awards are not due to differences in opportunities to exhibit valor, since those opportunities should also correspond to a higher risk of dying.
To further examine changes in the type of selection, we focus on the event that triggered the U.S. entry into the war, the attack on Pearl Harbor. We consider a differencein-difference specification
( 1 0 ) where  3 estimates the difference-in-difference of volunteer quality. That is, how did volunteer quality (relative to drafted men) change after this historical event.
In order for the estimate of  3 to be consistent, there must be convincing evidence that the U.S. entry into the war was unanticipated. If the event were anticipated, then the selection prior to the start of war would respond to the looming entry into the war.
This anticipation would bias  3 as a measure of the difference in selection due to the entry into war. Given the lack of active hostilities prior to the surprise attack on December 7th, 1941, and the state of open war after it, we take the attack as an unanticipated shock to the nature of selection into the military.
Processing drafted men could take six weeks, Flynn (1993, p. 24 ), so we must find a date to separate pre-and post-Pearl Harbor Army entrants. Selection on unobservables. Controlling for a large number of observables potentially relevant for sorting and military productivity do not mitigate the difference in high honors between volunteers and draftees. We next rely on the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) to quantitatively assess if selection on unobservables could explain the difference between the previous groups.
A positive estimate of  implies that the unobserved factors that determine volunteering and those that determine awards are positively associated,
In particular, let  ≡ X  . As shown in Altonji et al. (2005, p. 176) ,
( 1 1 ) We can use the degree of selection on observables as an indication of the degree of selection of unobservables; see Altonji et al. (2005) . Let the standardized amount of selection on unobservables relative to the standardized selection on observables be
Low values of  in (12) imply that even modest amounts of selection on unobservables are able to account for the mean difference between volunteers and draftees. On the other hand, if  is large, one would need a relatively large amount of selection on unobservables to account for differences in military performance. (If the amount of selection on unobservables is the same as the amount of selection on observables, then  = 1.)
We can estimate  using (11) and (12); the estimate of  for awards is 0.001. Thus, given the amount of selection on observables in the data, only one tenth of one percent in the standardized selection on unobservables is needed to account for the mean difference in awards between volunteers and drafted men. This reinforces the notion that selection according to unobservables is an important factor in driving the performance of volunteers.
For our analysis of death in service we obtained  = 00005, even stronger evidence in favor of selection on unobservables.
How much can observables explain? Let 0 denote the estimates of the parameter vector  in (7) for the sample of drafted men. 22 Let X 0 and X 1 denote the vector of observable characteristics of draftees and volunteers respectively. We next estimate the contribution of observable differences between volunteers and drafted men to the difference in awards, as in
We do not separately report the estimates 0 . However, in all specifications, observable characteristics can account for less than one third, and perhaps as little as a quarter, of the differences in performance between volunteers and drafted men. This implies that mimicking a voluntary force through a selective draft would not lead to a drafted army that performed similarly to the volunteers in World War II. Thus the attention of policy makers should not be towards making a draft "more selective" according to observable information.
Unit-by-unit analysis. The findings obtained thus far control for conditions at entry, but do not control for intermediate circumstances. Given the variety of experiences faced 22 Notice that the estimate 0 is consistent since there is no selection bias in the sample of drafted men. An alternative way to decompose mean differences in awards is to consider an estimate of  for the sample of volunteers, 1 . Since these estimates are influenced by selection, the inferences in this case are less transparent than those based on 0 .
by soldiers during World War II, these controls leave open the possibility of confounding influences in the opportunity to demonstrate valor. We now turn to the service records of men who served in the 63rd Infantry Division. This division, known as "Blood and The collection of the Division's morning reports and other documents is incomplete, as a handful of months of reports was missing from the Army's archives. However, from that which has been transcribed from the reports, we are able to determine who served in which group within the division (e.g., who served in Company A of the 253 Infantry Regiment).
Infantry regiments typically consist of three headquarters units (with approximately 400 men having served), which serve four lettered companies (manned by 600-900 men over the course of service), and several other support groups, such as a Medical company (200-300). In the data for the 63rd Infantry, we have over 100 of these company-level battle groups, and the rank of the soldier at the time of the reporting. Because men often switched groups during the war, they often appear in multiple company listings. We merge these listings with our enlistment files and fatality records, which drop duplicate serial numbers. With the completed merge, we have 48,357 observations, which reflects the service of 32,108 unique serial numbers.
Also included in the collection of rosters is an indicator if the soldier won a Bronze
Star or Purple Heart while serving in the particular group. Bronze Stars are awarded for acts of valor that do not meet the level of the Silver Star, while Purple Hearts reflect injury or death during service.
We re-apply the selection tests we use for the enlistment records, using these three new outcomes instead. The first specification is run without separate controls, while the 23 Daily Morning Reports, filed for each basic Army unit (e.g., infantry company or artillary battery), reflect the daily changes to the personnel in the unit: who left the unit due to casualties, transfer, etc; and who joined the unit. The morning reports include the name, rank and serial number for those listed. The list of the 63rd Division's morning reports list has been under the stewardship of Fred Clinton and William Scott, who provided it to us. second includes separate fixed effects for each of the over 100 battle groups. Thus, we test whether there is any difference in outcome between volunteers and drafted men overall, and to what extent any difference may be associated to the battle group in which one served. Table 7 reports the results from these specifications.
The sample size for these specifications is around 13,500 observations, with some differences due to missing data. Because men could only volunteer freely before 1943, we only include those men who entered the Army prior to 1943. From this sub-sample, about one quarter of the men in these units were volunteers. The results in Table 7 suggest evidence of advantageous selection, even with controls for battle group, but the limited sample limits the statistical power of these claims. Just under five percent of drafted men in the sub-sample earned Bronze Stars; volunteers were only slightly (two hundredths of a percent) more likely to earn a Bronze Star. The coefficient for volunteers grows substantially, to two and a half tenths of a percent, when the unit-level controls are added, though this is still not large enough to be statistically significant with such a limited sample. The coefficient for Silver Stars is proportionally the same (one third) as the underlying frequency of the award, though the limited sample leaves the point estimate not statistically significant from zero.
The one instance of effects large enough to be measured is for Purple Hearts. Almost four percent of drafted men in the sub-sample were awarded Purple Hearts; volunteers were a over a third more likely to be awarded a Purple Heart. This likely reflects differences in being wounded but not killed, as there is no difference in mortality between volunteers and drafted men, either here or in the entirety of service records we have collected. This effect grows slightly when the unit-level fixed effects are included.
What price valor. Acts of valor such as those studied here involve an increased risk of death.
24 Using this differential risk we can estimate how much pay is required to compensate soldiers for engaging in such acts of valor. We now provide a back-of-the-24 Individuals who earned awards were five and a half times times more likely to die in service than typical soldiers: among men who earned awards, there was a 15.37 percent mortality rate, whereas the average mortality rate was 2.75 percent. For killed in service: men winning awards were eight times more likely to die than average soldiers (12.4 percent vs. 1.56). These result are robust to the inclusion of controls.
envelope estimate of the cost differential between a drafted and a voluntary army, holding average quality constant.
The monetary value associated with the higher risk of death in acts of valor is equal to the risk of dying multiplied by the money premium required to bear a small increase in the probability of death, the value of statistical life. We use an estimate of the value of life in 1940 of $1 million, 2000 dollars. This amount was obtained by Rohlfs (2006) 
Conclusions
A voluntary army's quality exceeds or deceeds a drafted army's quality depending on whether selection is advantageous or adverse. This paper empirically examined the type of selection into the U.S. Army during World War II. In particular, we tested if volunteers represented an adversely selected sample of soldiers. Rather, we found evidence of advantageous selection. During the period in which volunteers and draftees could enter the Army in parallel, volunteers and drafted men exhibit no significant difference in fatality outcomes, but volunteers received more recognition for valor through the highest distinctions conferred by the U.S. Army.
We also attempted to shed some light on why volunteers performed better than draftees. We found that differences in performance can be ascribed to selection on unobservable characteristics and that differences in observable characteristics explain only a minor fraction of the volunteer-draftee differential. These findings provide prima facie evidence of some of the most important limitations drafted armies face. In addition, we found some weak evidence for adverse selection during peacetime: volunteers who entered the Army just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, received fewer awards than their observably equivalent drafted cohorts. Once the country declared war, those who joined the Army voluntarily went on to serve with more distinction than those who entered via the draft. In fact, the attack on Pearl Harbor seems to be the defining event that triggered advantageous selection. Estimates for linear probability models, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column represents a different set of controls for a regression, while each panel corresponds to a different dependent variable. The average incidence of the outcome in each sample is in parentheses next to the name of the outcome. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes: Estimates for probit models, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column represents a different set of controls for a regression, while each panel corresponds to a different dependent variable. The average incidence of the outcome in each sample is provided in the previous table. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 4 : Alternate Outcomes and Volunteer Status.
(1)
(1) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Note: Estimates for linear probability models, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column represents a different set of controls for a regression, while each panel corresponds to a different dependent variable. The average incidence of the outcome in each sample is in parentheses next to the name of the outcome. Means for County-month mortality rates are weighed by number of enlistees in each countymonth cell. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(1) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% A Derivation of (3) and (4) 
, to be consistent with the previous definition of random terms U m and U θ . Further,
Voluntary selection into the army corresponds to
Then, average productivity in the army under voluntary selection is: 
Finally, rearragments of previous expressions yield
This implies that if correlation between skills is sufficiently positive, the draft will yield higher productivity compared to a voluntary military.
B A Brief History of the U.S. Draft, NOT FOR PUB-LICATION
This section contains a brief description of the most relevant aspects of the draft and the voluntary enlistments during World War II. We also present a brief discussion about the assignment of soldiers within the Army, as this form of selection also influences the outcomes we are interested in. The discussion we present here is not comprehensive but it serves as a guide for our empirical analysis. The material is drawn primarily from the many reports of the Selective Service System, SSP (1942 ), SSW (1943 , SSWT (1945) and SSV (1948) . On September 16, 1940, Congress passed the Selective Service Act that required civilian males between the ages of 21 and 36 to register later to be classified and selected by over 6,400 local draft boards, see SSV (1948, Table 44 ). As in previous wars, the Selective Service System provided that quotas were assigned to each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, on the basis of the number of registrants liable for service. This initial registration and the first calls of the draft were precipitated by the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940 and took place before the declaration of war by the United States. After the U.S. entered World War II, in December 1941, legislation amended the act to require all men from 18 to 65 to register with those aged 18 to 45 being immediately liable for induction. For the duration of the war, men aged 18-26 were the main source of military manpower. Similarly, the initial terms of one year of training and service were also extended to accommodate the manpower needs as the war progressed.
In total, there were seven national draft registrations. The first occurred in October 16, 1940, and the last took place between November 16 and December 31, 1943 31, , SSV (1948 . Once men registered, the local boards' first step was to send out information forms to each potential draftee in order to classify them based on the ability to serve and eligibility for deferments.
25 After the classification procedure, each potential draftee received an order number to be used in the national lottery that determined the random selection. These national lotteries went to extraordinary lengths to ensure independence and transparency, see, e.g., Flynn (1993, pp. 24-5) and Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer (1986) ).
The World War II draft was the largest and notably the most democratic draft implemented in the United States. There were no general protests against the draft, registration was universal, and approval of the implementation and administration of the draft was unanimous, see, e.g., SSP (1942, 19) . Draft evasion accounted for less than five percent of the total inducted and there was to be no racial discrimination in the selection and train-25 The classification system under the Act was dynamic but at the core it had four categories: Class I, persons available for training and service after the physical examination; Class II, persons available for service but temporarily deferred because of occupation; Class III, persons who had dependents requiring their support, and Class IV, persons who are except from training and service by statute, or were nondeclaring aliens, or had completed military service (up to Pearl Harbor), or conscientious objectors against both combat and non-combat service, or who were physically, mentally, or morally unfit for service, see SSV (1948, 62) .
ing.
26 Deferments were offered but they were quite limited especially as war progressed. The World War II draft had no college deferments.
27 Other than mental and physical disabilities, the primary reasons for deferment were employment in war production or agriculture, or the presence of dependents. These deferments, however, were considerably weakened or granted disproportionately to older individuals as war progressed and the manpower pool of young men was depleted.
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The contribution of draftees to the U.S. armed forces was substantial. The total number of inductions is listed in Table 8 where the number of inductions is broken down by year. A total of 10,110,104 men were drafted between November 1940 and October 1946. During 1942 alone, more than 3 million people were incorporated into the Army. This year is of special importance for our analyses as during 1942, voluntary enlistments were also possible.
Of key importance for our analyses is the fact that voluntary enlistments did not end with the enactment of the draft. Congress and the public expected that voluntary enlistments would hold down inductions as much as possible. In fact, extensive newspaper and radio campaigns and a Nation-wide recruiting service were in place to secure volunteers, see, e.g., SSW (1943, 68-69) . However, nearly a year after Pearl Harbor, on December 5, 1942, voluntary enlistments of men aged 18-37 were prohibited and not reinstated until after the end of the War. From the reports of the Selective Service System, there is no indication that this prohibition was associated with shortages of volunteers.
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For the remaining of the war, volunteering was allowed to a very limited degree. Volunteering through the Selective Service System, known as voluntary induction, was permitted but "it was restricted and made more difficult of accomplishment," see, SSW
26 There was a particular interest on the draft status of notable figures. Their status conformed well to the idea of a random assignment, see, Flynn (1993, pp. 26-8) . Evidence of inappropriate behavior from local board members was limited and assessments suggest that "incidences of this sort were relatively rare," see Flynn (1993, pp. 29) . On the other hand, the total number of individual violations to the Act reported by the Department of Justice was 13,986 which mostly represented conscientious objectors, see SSV (1948, Table 42) . 27 Initially, a minimum level of fourth-grade literacy was required for service but after the summer of 1942, "any registrant who is able to understand simple orders in English and possesses sufficient intelligence to absorb military training rapidly is eligible for induction into military service," see SSV (1948, 120) . The minimum (60 inches) and maximum (78 inches) height for usual admittance in the Army were not limiting factors even during peacetime, see, SSP (1942, 212) .
28 Married men with dependents were initially deferred and there is evidence of an increase in marriage rates to avoid the draft, see SSW (1943, Section VIII). After Pearl Harbor, the information used for claiming deferments became public knowledge and these deferments required explicit proof, see SSW (1943, 133) . On June 1942, the President approved the Servicemen's Dependent Allowance Act which ensure a monthly family allowance and also served to liberalize the induction of married men.
29 Voluntary enlistments were terminated by the Executive Order 9279 which argued that "In order to promote the most effective mobilization and utilization of the national manpower and to eliminate so far as possible waste of manpower due to disruptive recruitment and undue migration of workers." No evidence of practices associated with disruptive recruitment and undue migrations are discussed in detail in the multiple Selective Service Systems reports. Among the "evils" of voluntary enlistments, these reports, however, argue that volunteers "evade the orderly process of the Selective Service. The armed forces told these men that by enlistment they could determine their own assignment," see, SSW (1943, 68) . (1943, 68) . Among the groups eligible for voluntary induction were convicts and individuals formerly considered morally disqualified, U.S. citizens of Japanese extraction, and 17-year-olds, SSWT (1945, 228) . Evidence on the restrictions on volunteering is evident in our sample which only includes 68,671 volunteers in 1943, less than four percent of those who joined the Army in our records. The majority of these individuals entered into the Army during the first months of 1943 since individuals who applied for voluntary enlistment before December 5, 1942, were allowed to enter the Army.
Overall, volunteers represented a considerable fraction of the men furnished to the armed forces during World War II. According to the SSV (1948 , Table 135 ) reproduced in Table 8 below, volunteers represented about 34 percent of all men in the armed forces. The fraction of volunteers in our sample is also included for comparability purposes although our data only covers the Army and the Air Force.
Our sample of enlistment records represents a large portion of the entire enlistment records for the U.S. Army. The records used here were digitized, as part of an effort to reconstruct records lost in the 1973 fire at the National Military Personnel Records Center in St. Louis. Our sample from the National Archives is comparable to that of the entire armed forces, though it excludes officers. A small fraction records from the original data provided by the National Archives were dropped due to data inconsistency for key variables, such as year of enlistment (e.g., drop if 1990). Also, we remove the enlistment records of Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. The final set of data includes entry records for over fifty-seven percent of the entire military. Figure 4 plots the number of draftees and volunteers in our sample and the total number of inductions according to the selective service system. Between 1940 and 1942, the total number of draft inductions was 4,775,836 and our sample includes two thirds of them. After 1943, the available record becomes less complete. The total number of draft inductions was 9,685,945 and the total number of volunteers was 4,987,144. In our sample, these values are 6,233,210 and 1,555,351. In the pre-1943 period, volunteers make up twenty-eight percent of those who entered the Army, which is representative of the overall conditions of the war. This is one of the reasons for our focus on the pre-1943 period. A more important reason for our pre-1943 focus is that volunteering virtually ended at the end of 1942.
The data report information on the individual joining the military: name, serial number, race, citizenship status, education, prior occupation, state and county of residence, initial rank and branch, and marital status, among other things. As will be described below, for some records, height, weight, and performance on an military entrance test are also recorded. There are 8,075,352 records, after removing observations with incomplete or missing data.
Whether a soldier entered the Army as a volunteer or a induced via the draft can be determined by the assigned serial number (U.S. War Department (1942)). Men already in the Army kept their original serial number, which was less than 10,000,000. In order to satisfy the demands of a drastically growing Army, new serial numbers starting with 11,000,000 were used. Men who enlisted on or after July 1, 1940, or had their National Guard units inducted into Federal service, were assigned numbers from 11,000,000 to 30,000,000. Men inducted into the Army under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 were given serial numbers starting with 31,000,000, independent of prior service. We identify volunteers by the first digit of their serial number: 0, 1, or 2. Drafted men are those with first digits of 3 or 4. Two tenths of a percent of the sample have first digits of five or higher. Because the original documentation does not provide a context for such serial numbers, they are dropped from the sample. (This is why the final column of Table  8 sums to 99.8.)
C Data on Death, POW, MIA and Awards, NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In order to measure the outcomes of each individual in the serial number data file, we merge it with a series of lists constructed by the military. The awards garnered by any particular soldier can be accessed by requesting the Department of Defense. However, there is no definitive published list for Silver Stars. The U.S. government does not have a centralized electronic database of awards; instead, the announcements of the awards have been collected from a series of books published by the U.S. government. The list of Silver Star and Distinguished Service Cross recipients used here was compiled by Colonel Albert F. Gleim, from military records, in an effort to identify those who falsely claim distinguished military service. By Col. Gleim's rough estimate, his listing should include eighty percent of all of those who received Silver Stars and nearly all of the Distinguished Service cross recipients. These names were transcribed by hand by C. Douglas Sterner, and posted on his website, Homeofheroes.com. We have cross-referenced the list from his web site with several pages of Col. Gleim's books.
The list of Silver Star recipients has 56,487 names. We merged the publicly available list to the enlistment data by name. In order to guarantee a proper merging, we purged the enlistment data of all non-unique names. After merging, there are 5,479,802 observations in total, 22,835 of which received honors (21,360 Silver Stars). Because volunteering was drastically limited at the end of 1942, we focus on this earlier period, leaving us with 2,872,134 observations.
The lists of killed in service used here were compiled by the War Department at the close of World War II. Those listed died between President Roosevelt's declaration of unlimited national emergency on May 31, 1941, and January 31, 1946 . Each listing includes, name, rank, serial number, type of casualty. The types of casualty allowed were killed in action (KIA), died of wounds (DOW, wounded in battle but died later), died of injury (DOI, the same), and died, non-battle (DNB, e.g., sickness, suicide, homicide, training). The names were compiled by each state and county. These records were digitized by the American Battle Monuments Commission as part of the World War II National Monument. The ABMC provided their digitized list to us.
The list of prisoners of war was provided by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). NARA digitized the list of names from the War Department's Adjutant General's Office, which compiled the names. Each record includes name, rank, serial number, and prisoner-status information, such as detaining power. An official list of World War II soldiers still missing in action is available from the Department of Defense.
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These records include name and serial number.
As the varying sample sizes in each regression suggest, the nature of merging varies across the outcome considered. The merge success rate of each merge can be found in Table 9 . The files listing those who died in action, as well as the missing in action and prisoner of war lists, include the soldier's serial number. The merge rate of the award recipients is 40 percent, versus three quarters of the outcomes merged by serial numbers.
Because we do not have the serial numbers of the award recipients, we cannot distinguish between the enlisted men and officers. Officers are not included in the serial number file, so this can artificially diminish the merge rate of the awards. For both the POW and the killed in service lists, non-numeric serial numbers consist of approximately 17 percent of the sample. These three conditions (uniquely named non-officer in our sample) suggests a merge rate in the area of 40 to 50 percent.
To test if these different merging methods have an impact on the results, we re-run the regressions on died in service, each twice. The first time includes the entire sample, while the second drops all soldiers with duplicate names. Table 10 reports the results of these regressions. The general trend of results is the same: all of the effects are of similar size, typically within 95 percent confidence intervals of each other, and shrinking as more explanatory variables are included. Note: Number of persons joining the Army and how, according to official records, and our data. Notes: Estimates for linear probability models, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column represents a different set of controls for a regression. The average incidence of the outcome in each sample is in parentheses next to the name of the outcome. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
